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* * * * *
PROCEEDINGS
PROFESSOR WALLACE:
Thank you Dean Pike and good
morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Perry Wallace. I’m a
member of the faculty here at the Washington College of Law. I have
the great pleasure of serving as moderator for this first panel whose
topic and subject will be, “The Collapse of the Corporate Model.”
Over the past year, since the series of corporate debacles beginning
with the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the world has watched
with a great deal of concern. It’s rare that members of the lay public
and the non-financial media have concerned themselves so greatly
with subjects such as corporate governance, financial reporting, audit
committees, insider trading, and probably above all, accounting,
even. But this collapse has evoked numerous discussions including
the value of the model, the worth of it, whether or not it should be
changed, and if so, in what ways.
We have with us, and we’re awfully lucky to have, a distinguished
panel of participants who will help us in answering some of the
questions of the day.
They are, and beginning on the left, Charles Davidow, who is a
Partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Mr. Davidow is a specialist in
securities law. He is particularly specialized in internal investigations.
In fact, he served as special counsel to the special committee of the
Enron Board of Directors and is now serving in a similar capacity in
the WorldCom matter. So we’re very pleased and happy to have Mr.
Davidow with us today.
Next to him and to his right there is Jim Gunderson. Jim is former
General Counsel and at present is Corporate Development Counsel
with Schlumberger Ltd.
Next to him is Professor Jim Peters who is a professor of accounting
at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of
Maryland.
Each gentleman will approach the subject from his own particular
specialty, but we’ve invited them to share with us from their views that
may range much more broadly than their particular specialties.
We’re hoping that as they proceed this morning we’ll find answers
to a number of questions, or at least commentary on a number of
questions such as, “What went wrong? Who or what, to the degree
there may be systematic implications here, would be to blame?” Not
to steal the thunder of any of the other panels, but “Will Sarbanes-
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1

Oxley and the various other reforms work?”
“What should be the goal of corporate governance today and on
into the future going forward?” Finally, “Can you help us out? What
can you tell students who are looking forward to joining your ranks
and participating, and participating well, in a manner that’s
consistent with concerns regarding value, concerns regarding social
balance, economic justice, and the like?”
So, without more, I would like to have us begin if we could with Jim
Gunderson of Schlumberger. We’ll then proceed with another Jim,
Jim Peters, and we’ll end with Chuck Davidow. Gentlemen.
MR. GUNDERSON: Thank you. Good morning. I’ll give you a
little bit of perspective, partly from having been the Secretary and
General Counsel of Schlumberger Limited, which is a big,
multinational oilfield services and other technology company listed
2
on the New York Stock Exchange. It’s a little bit unique in how
global it is and how global its board is.
I’ll talk to you from the perspective of having worked for three
years trying to facilitate good governance there and, since then,
helping some other companies as a consultant to boards trying to
help them perform good governance.
What I’d like to do is really make two points. One point is, “What
3
is the governance model?” Then I’d like to talk a little bit about the
key things we depend on boards for and the extent to which they may
or may not have been doing their jobs in that respect.
The model of American corporate governance is not identical with
that of the United Kingdom, the European continent, or other
4
countries around the world. The United States is an extreme
example of the model in which, basically, the Chief Executive Officer
5
(“CEO”) runs the company. That’s the American model. We look
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
2. For more information on Schlumberger Limited, see Schlumberger Limited
website at http://www.slb.com.
3. See generally GREGORY V. VARALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE COUNSEL (Section
of Business Law 1996) (describing the structure, role, and duties of a corporate
board of directors).
4. See generally DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NONEXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (2003) (reviewing recent corporate governance practice in the
United Kingdom), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/non_exec_review/pdfs/
higgsreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2003); REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF
COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN
EUROPE (European Commission 2002) (describing the recent corporate governance
practice in Europe), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
5. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 232 (7th ed. 1999) (defining Chief
Executive Officer as “[a] corporation’s highest-ranking administrator who manages
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to the CEO for the vision. We look to the CEO for the leadership.
7
We look to the CEO to be the ultimate manager of the company.
As an investor, we don’t worry about who the independent
directors are very much. I don’t think many asset managers even
know who the independent directors are of some of the companies
they follow closely. They look at the CEO and they would know the
CFO, the chief financial officer, and some of the top operating
managers better than they would know anything about the
independent directors.
As employees we don’t really think about the board of directors.
Within companies—and this could be within a General Motors, it
8
could be within a mid-cap company, people don’t talk about the
board that much. The symbol of the ultimate authority of the
company is the CEO. That shouldn’t be so surprising because in the
United States, the idea of management by committee, or strategy by
9
committee, is something we don’t generally think makes much sense.
We want to know who is in charge, and we want to make sure the
right person is in charge.
10
Again, I’m not describing what the law says, nor am I describing
what policymakers say. But that’s really the way it works. I think
there are reasons—cultural as I just mentioned. In the United States,
the notion that the board is overseeing the management of the
11
company, even that is problematic.

the firm day by day and reports to the board of directors.”).
6. See Ralph Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest
for Charismatic CEOs (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
7. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 82-84
(Student ed., American Law Institute 1994). See generally Harry G. Henn & John R.
Alexander, Laws of Corporations §§ 180-256 (3d ed. 1983) (outlining the corporate
management structure).
8. See Paul Merriman Answers Your Questions: What Is Large-cap, Mid-cap and Smallcap, FundAdvice.com (defining mid-cap as a means of characterizing the size of a
company based on its market capitalization), at http://www.fundadvice.com/
QA/071801a.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003); see also id. (establishing that the
general parameters of a mid-cap company’s market capitalization as being between
$1 billion and $30 billion).
9. See generally Nat’l Assoc. of Corp. Dirs., Report of the NACE Blue Ribbon
Commission on the Role of the Board in Corporate Strategy (2000) (discussing the
Board's role in contributing to, evaluating, and approving management's strategy for
the company).
10. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations,
supra note 7, at 82-84 (contrasting what corporation law statutes say and what
typically occurs in practice).
11. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 171 (2d
ed. 2001) (“Directors are beholden to management for nomination, compensation,
and information. Moreover, many directors are unable or unwilling to devote the
time or energy necessary to oversee the operation of the company . . . .”).
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Boards, in our system, are entirely dependent on management for
information. They’re entirely dependent on management for
analysis. Most board presentations involve review of company
performance; they’re essentially management presenting the results,
and what they’ve done. It’s very unlikely that management is going to
present their performance as unacceptable, even if the company’s
performance has not been very good.
This hasn’t been helped by the advent of PowerPoint
presentations. Boards have suffered the same thing that every other
forum for discussion has suffered where the PowerPoint presentation
drives home one point, maybe two points, and everything flows to
12
that point.
So management presentations to boards have become more and
more like sales presentations. When it comes to the board overseeing
strategy, or participating in strategy, the situation is even more
extreme. Because you have the PowerPoint presentations, they very
strongly present the views of management. Management has already
had its internal discussions where they’ve brought up the issues.
What happens when it gets to the board is, they have all agreed, “This
is the direction we’re going,” and they present why it’s a good idea
and then they bring investment bankers in who only get paid if this
deal goes through.
So the forces on boards are overwhelming. To expect them to be
effective monitors of strategy, I think, is really unrealistic. In the
American system, the market is really doing the assessment.
The market is assessing performance. The market is assessing
strategy. Although it’s true that boards from time to time fire CEOs,
they generally don’t fire CEOs because they’ve done the analysis and
they’ve decided based on these performance figures we get in the
boardroom. This has to be done. The market is already screaming
for blood. Top managers are already leaving the company. The
board pulls the trigger. But they don’t really make the decision.
Now I’m oversimplifying for the sake of time and hopefully to
generate some discussion and controversy. But essentially, that’s the
way it works. That’s the first point. “What’s the model?” That’s the
model.
The second point then, “Are boards important? What do we have
boards for?” Because they are obviously the central subject when
12. See generally Ian Parker, Absolute PowerPoint: Can a Software Package Edit Our
Thoughts?, New Yorker (May 28, 2001) (arguing that the way in which the PowerPoint
software program organizes inputted information dictates how its users view their
environment), available at http://www.physics.ohio-state.edu/~wilkins/group/
powerpt.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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people are discussing corporate governance.
Boards are extremely important. They play a very important role
in U.S. governance in two important respects. One, I’ll leave
primarily to Professor Peters, because I wouldn’t dare go down that
path in front of a true expert. So I’ll leave aside the role of assurance
on the financial reporting side.
The other central role they play has to do with incentives.
Corporate governance in the United States since the 1930s has really
revolved around one problem. It’s this problem that shareholders
for a number of reasons, although they in a sense own the company,
13
do not control the company. Unless you have a major shareholder,
or some other special factor, it is management that controls the
14
corporation.
The separation of ownership from control spawns this problem
that it’s tempting for managers, managing this company they don’t
own, to not actually do what’s best for the shareholders, but do what’s
best for themselves. It could be from the standpoint of being lazy,
poor performers or being dishonest and looting the company.
15
We call it the agency problem, and it’s really the central problem
16
of governance. The board of directors is all we have to look after
the alignment of management’s interests with the interests of the
13. See generally Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation &
Private Property (Harcort, Brace & World, Inc. 1932) (discussing the ownership and
control issues of a corporation).
14. See MARCO BECHT ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL 20-21
(European Corporate Governance Institute Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002,
2002) (explaining the purposes of disbursing shareholder interests). In the United
States and U.K., ownership in listed companies tends to be widely disbursed for a
number of reasons, including the size of investors’ wealth compared to the market
capitalization of the companies invested in, the desire for diversifying risk by
spreading investment over a number of firms, and the investor’s desire for liquidity
of smaller stakes. With small interests in many companies, disbursed shareholders
are unlikely to incur the monitoring costs of trying to oversee management and have
the disincentives of the collective action and free rider problems against trying to
exercise control. See id. at 31-38 (surveying literature on influence by major
shareholders).
15. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §§ 4.1-4.2, at 141-54 (3d ed. 1986)
(explaining that the agency problem that confronts corporate officers and directors
stems from their fiduciary duties to the corporation and the shareholders). See
generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-60 (1976)
(discussing the costs of an agency relationship), available at http://www.sciencessociales.ens.fr/~adirer/textes/Jensen-Meckling.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
Management is seen as the agent of the investors in the company, and the agency
problem involves “moral hazard”—the agent, being self-interested, may not focus
entirely on the investors’ interests where they do not coincide with the managers’
interests. The sum of the costs to the investor/principle of monitoring the
manager/agent non-performance is referred to as the “agency costs” of the
separation of ownership and management. Id.
16. BECHT ET AL., supra note 14.
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shareholders. There is no one else who can do that.
Primarily we look to independent directors to look at
compensation, incentives, perquisites, and the conflicts of interests
that exist within companies and to align the interests of managers
17
with the interests of the shareholders. We mainly look toward stockbased compensation as the tool for aligning the interests of
management with shareholders. This is where things have gone
horribly wrong in the last decade.
The idea of giving stock to directors at first blush seems very
straightforward. That is, apparently, a perfect alignment of interests
until you think about it a little bit. The idea that market value of
stock is a good indicator of company performance requires that you
18
believe the efficient capital market hypothesis, that the market
actually has the best information on performance. That’s probably
true for portfolio managers. But management knows more than the
market about how the company is performing.
If you think about it, if you give management a lot of stock, the
intelligent time for them to sell is when they think the difference
between the real value and the market value is greatest. So there is a
bit of a potential conflict there. The way that used to be dealt with
19
before the 1990s was with restricted stock. Restricted stock was the
17. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING
STANDARDS COMMITTEE 10 (2002) (explaining that aligning management and
shareholder interest in typically done through a compensation committee of
independent directors, which would be required under the New York Stock
Exchange’s proposed changes to its listing standards), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003); SUMMARY
OF NASDAQ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS 3 (2003) (stating that under Nasdaq’s
proposed standards changes, CEO and other executive compensation would require
approval by either an independent compensation committee or by a majority of the
independent directors), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Web_Corp_Gov
_Summary%20Feb-revised.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
18. See Fred Tam, Markets Not Entirely Efficient, BUS. TIMES (MALAYSIA), Nov. 4,
2002, at 7 (defining efficient market hypothesis (EMH) as security prices at anytime
that “fully reflect” all available market information); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets, FOUND. FIN. 133 (1976) (“An efficient capital market is a market that is
efficient in processing information. The prices of securities observed at any time are
based on “correct” evaluation of all information available at the time . . . [I]f the
capital market is to function smoothly in allocating resources, prices of securities
must be good indicators of value.”).
19. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1984) (allowing the articles of
incorporation, bylaws, agreements among shareholders, and other agreements
between the shareholders and the corporation to impose restriction on the
transferability of a corporation’s stock). Restricted stock grants are shares of stock
granted to an executive subject to restrictions on sale or transfer for periods often
ranging from three to five years, during which the executive receives dividends and
has voting rights. If the executive’s employment is terminated before the end of the
restriction period, the unvested award generally is forfeited. Id. Most courts allow
that the restrictions on shares must be reasonable, such as when the restriction
preserves an state or federal securities law exemption. Id. § 6.27 cmt. Another
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main stock-based compensation component used for executive
compensation. You can’t sell the stock. You have got to hold it just
like the long-term institutions that can’t afford to sell the stock. That
was a good system.
But in the 1990s, because of tax and accounting advantages and
basically this tremendous value it brought to executives, employee
20
stock options took over. Employee stock options do not at all align
the interests of executives with shareholders.
If I get a stock option grant for 10,000 shares at the market price at
that time, let’s say it’s $50, if the stock moves up $1, the value of that
investment, in terms of what I can get for it if I exercise right away,
goes from zero to $10,000. Whereas, for the shareholder it goes from
$50 to $51—a movement of 2% versus a movement of infinite
percent. The next dollar it goes up, to $52, doubles the value of that
option to me in terms of what I can exercise, whereas for the
shareholders, it’s a 4% change.
In the other direction it’s even more dramatic. For an executive
with stock options, the difference between the stock dropping to
forty-nine and the stock dropping to one is the same. The stock
option goes underwater. Now, I’m exaggerating to make the point.
But, largely, after a certain point, it doesn’t matter how far it goes
down. So, the incentive to take on risk to move that stock up is huge
for executives with employee stock options.
Now picture the team responsible for financial disclosure: the
CEO, the CFO, the general counsel, all having most of their wealth in
employee stock options. The prospect of the market concluding that
fortunes are turning for that company is going to cost those
individuals responsible for financial disclosure. Maybe it’s hundreds
of thousands of dollars, maybe it’s millions of dollars. That’s the kind
of pressure that management has had.
The companies that we have seen that have had the most problems
have been high growth companies where the wealth accumulation of
those executives has been enormous.
Compensation committees were supposed to be looking after that.
Independent directors on compensation committees were supposed
example of a reasonable restriction is when a company has a few shareholders and
those shareholders restrict the transferability of the stock to guarantee that the
current shareholders maintain control of the corporation. Id.
20. Marcel Kahan, Symposuim, Norms and Corporate Law: The Limited Significance of
Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1888 (2001) (highlighting the
increasing importance of stock options to executive compensation by stating that less
than one-third of public companies provided executive stock options in 1980
compared to approximately two-third of the public companies in 1995).
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to be looking at the incentives. That’s what they’re there for. They
were also supposed to have been looking at the prerequisites, at the
executive use of company assets. That’s one area where they
completely fell down.
The people supporting board activity,
including company secretaries, board consultants and the like, fell
down completely, in my opinion.
So, in the interests of time, those were the two points I really
wanted to make. It is that as a practical matter, the CEO is in charge
of the company, and I think it was a bit of a distraction during the
1990s that forums about corporate governance spent lots of time
talking about how can boards enhance strategy, how can boards
enhance performance.
They were looking at the wrong thing. They should have been
looking at their central role, which is to align managers with the
interests of shareholders and address the agency problem.
Now, in this group, in the questions later, I’d be glad to get into
more specifics about the in-house counsel’s role, but I just wanted to
make those points because I think they’re important starting points
along with the others that we’ll be hearing.
PROFESSOR WALLACE:
Jim, thank you very, very much.
Professor Peters.
PROFESSOR PETERS: Thank you. Let me first build on Jim’s
comment to set up my own comments and that is that the real
discipline on these companies is in the stock market, not the board of
directors.
The question is, “How does the stock market know what a company
is doing?” I think Jim alluded to this fact—it’s fundamentally their
published financial statements that are supposed to be audited by us
guys.
So that’s what I want to address is first of all; I want to spend a little
time in history. One of my major points is that this isn’t new. It’s
happened before. It’s really kind of a fundamental artifact of the free
market system. It will probably happen again no matter what we do.
It’s a matter of, “Can we do things to try to mitigate the damage next
time it happens?”
Then I want to try to expand on that by looking at the role of the
auditor, the role of the financial accounting standard setting process,
and, if I get time, I’ll pick on attorneys. But I really don’t want to do
that.
But it was a corporate attorney for Arthur Andersen’s e-mail that
actually brought that company down. It wasn’t Duncan shredding
documents that the jury hung up on. So attorneys can have some
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21

significant impact in these companies.
Anyway, the role of the auditor is to be the independent assurer of
these financial statements. It’s part of the agency problem. It’s
called moral hazard. If stockholders are assessing the company based
on information, it’s information that management produces. So you
can see you’re evaluating somebody and the only information you
have is the information they’re giving you. That’s called moral
hazard.
The independent auditor is supposed to break through that issue
and provide an independent assurance that the information you’re
getting accurately reflects the economic activity of the company. So
how did that part of the process break down?
I’ve got to go back to the turn of the last century. Every profession
has anti-competitive provisions in their profession. Up until about
the late 1960s, 1970s, accountants could not advertise. They could
not solicit clients. I think the simplest thing to say is, it was a
profession that recognized its social responsibility.
22
The Supreme Court lifted the prohibition against advertising,
and at least one lower court found that partners in CPA firms were
23
not owners and could be fired. Those fundamental changes shifted
accounting from being a profession to a business. All of the sudden
auditors wanted to do what they saw attorneys do, which was make big
bucks. Accounting became a commodity. Auditing became a
commodity.
You think about it from the corporate standpoint, you’re paying
millions of dollars to a firm to come in and give you what used to be
24
two and is now three paragraphs. That’s what an audit opinion is;
it’s three standard paragraphs that are a template right out of a
textbook. That’s what you’re paying millions of dollars for.
21. See Jonathan Weil et al., Auditor’s Ruling: Andersen Win Lifts U.S. Enron Case—
Shredding Wasn’t Factor in Verdict Jurors Say; A Single E-mail Was Prelude to the Main Event,
WALL ST. J., June 17, 2002, at A1 (reporting that the jury pointed to an e-mail sent by
Arthur Andersen’s in-house counsel as the outcome determinative fact in convicting
Andersen of obstructing the SEC’s investigation of the Enron Collapse); see also id.
(identifying David B. Duncan as the former Arthur Andersen partner who headed
the Enron Audit).
22. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (finding that a prohibition
against advertising by certified public accountants violates their constitutional right
to free speech).
23. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that plaintiff was an employee and not a partner because he had no
authority to direct the management of the accounting firm).
24. D. EDWARD MARTIN, ATTORNEY’S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL
REPORTING § 12.01[1] (Matthew Bender 4th ed. 2002)(defining an audit opinion as
the report prepared by an auditor that provides an opinion regarding the reliability
of a company’s reported financial information and the supporting data).
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From the corporate standpoint, it was a necessity that they had to
have, but it wasn’t something that they perceived as really adding
value to the firm. So this put a lot of cost pressure on the
accountants to reduce the cost of the audit. Their best and brightest
people started to shift into consulting where they could make some
money.
To try to mitigate this problem, auditors are supposed to be hired
by the auditing committee of the board of directors, which is
supposed to be made up of all outside directors. But as my colleague
has already pointed out, on the surface that really may sound like a
control, but it really isn’t because these people are being driven by
the information they get from managers.
For example, take Enron. Enron had seventeen on the Board of
25
Directors.
Of them, fourteen were outside Directors.
The
Chairman of their Audit Committee was a former dean of Stanford
26
Business School. I can’t remember his first name; Jaedicke was his
27
last name. He was an outstanding accountant.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the stock exchange efforts and things
to push more independent directors is fine, but Enron already met or
exceeded those requirements. But it didn’t make any difference
because of the things that Jim pointed out. It is that management has
such enormous control over the information that’s being fed to these
boards of directors, and consequently, when the boards of directors
interface with the auditors, they are pretty much re-enforcing what
the management wants.
From the auditor’s standpoint, I mean it’s fundamentally auditing
the hand that feeds you.
You’re supposed to be hired by
independent outside directors. We’ve already established that really
isn’t the truth. So, you deal on a day-to-day basis with management.
If you’re getting, as Andersen was with Enron, a lot more money from
your consulting practice with that client than you are with the
auditing practice, it’s going to put your ethics in tremendous tension
with your economics.
The one other thing that I think that we need to be very honest
about is human behavior. I don’t care who you are, if your ethics are
constantly in direct conflict with your economics, eventually
somebody is going to break. Eventually most of us would break. I
don’t think I or anybody else in this room would like to admit it, but
25. See ENRON CORP. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 54-55 (2001), at http://enron.com/
corp/investors/annuals/2000/ar2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
26. Id.
27. Professor Peters is referring to Mr. Robert K. Jaedicke. Id.
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if somebody walked up to me and handed me a $100 million check to
do something that was kind of unethical but nobody would die, I’d be
seriously tempted. I’m sorry.
28
That’s the—you got to understand that Ken Lay and Fastow, that’s
the order of magnitude of the compensation that we’re talking about.
It’s not hundreds of thousands. It’s not millions. It’s hundreds of
millions of dollars that are on the line with these—with the stock
options and the changes in the stock prices.
So that’s the environment that auditors live in. Unfortunately,
unlike attorneys where you have a clear social responsibility to be an
advocate for your client, we are supposed to be an advocate against
our client. We are supposed to be the independent outside check of
the client who hired us. That puts us in a tremendous conflict of
interest.
I think that we can do—first of all, I think auditors and accountants
in general are highly ethical people. I think attorneys are the same.
We are good people. They are good people in a very difficult
situation. I don’t care how good you are eventually something is
going to hang up.
This has happened before. I mean, I imagine there were
conferences like this around the late- 1920s, early 1930s when the
stock market crashed. That’s where we got the Securities and
29
Exchange Acts,
that created the Securities and Exchange
Commission. That was the attempt at the time to deal with the same
sort of abuses that happened when the stock market collapsed in
1929.
The other commonality here is that things turned sour. Jim made
the very excellent point—the stock market expects continuous
growth in earnings. That’s what they expect companies to do. They
like stability because it’s predictable.
That’s where you get what’s called earnings management. You get
some gains that are being played that sometimes don’t look quite
optimal because companies are trying to make themselves look worse.
But they’re trying to make themselves look smooth. If they’re coming
into an environment where they’re making a heck of a lot of money
in one year, they will often cook the books downward, in order to set
them up to do better the next year and keep that stable growth rate.
28. Ken Lay and Andy Fastow sat on Enron’s Board of Directors. ENRON CORP.
2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 54-69. Mr. Lay was Chairman of Enron while
Mr. Fastow was Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer. Id. Both Mr.
Lay and Mr. Fastow were members of Enron’s Policy Committee. Id.
29. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2000); Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78-78mm (2000).
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Well, we had a nice stable run-up in the 1990s, and the party was
going fine. But eventually the party has to come to an end. It always
does. It’s what they call the business cycle. But when you get to the
end of the party, nobody wants to be the first one to leave.
Consequently, managers started cooking the books upward to try to
maintain that growth, so they could go to the stock market and say, “I
know the economy is turning—softening. But we’re hanging in there
and we’re doing well on the earnings.”
That’s what started to happen with WorldCom when they started
capitalizing expenses. It’s kind of like taking the money you put into
your gas tank and saying well, that’s going to give me benefit for the
next ten years, so I’m not going to write that off as an expense. I’m
going to call it an asset. They were taking daily expenses, and there
was nothing particularly complicated about what WorldCom was
doing. It was just good old-fashioned fraud.
What Enron was doing was something much more creative. They
30
created what are called special purpose entities, hundreds of them.
Enron is a good example of the other group that I want to bring into
play here, it is the standard setters. But let me finish off with the
auditors.
First of all, the fundamental point here is that they’re in a very
difficult situation. They are being placed in a situation where they
have to audit the hand that feeds them. Here’s where I’m going to
first of all say that I speak for myself and no other accountant because
I’d probably get shot at dawn for saying this. I think it’s time to go
back to what was considered in the 1930s when they had the SEC
31
Acts on the table and nationalize auditing. We’ve got to change the
system where the companies hire their own auditors.
The only mechanism I can see that has the credibility, and the
power, and the strength to do that is some arm of the federal
32
government, particularly the GAO.
I think the GAO has had a
tremendous reputation of being an independent agency in an
enormously politically charged environment. They get away with this
because the Comptroller General is appointed for fifteen years. So
changes in administration don’t affect them.
30. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1405 (defining special purpose
entity as “[a] business established to perform no function other than to develop,
own, and operate a large, complex project (usually called a single-purpose project),
especially so as to limit the number of creditors claiming against the project.”).
31. See statutes cited supra note 29.
32. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 691 (defining General
Accounting Office (GAO) as “[t]he federal agency that provides legal and
accounting assistance to Congress, audits and investigates federal programs, and
settles certain contract claims against the United States.”).
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The current Comptroller General, David Walker, is a former
partner of Pricewaterhouse Coopers. I’ve met him. He’s a really nice
guy, and I’m on some committees with him. I commented one day to
him that I consider him to be the ultimate example of auditor
independence, because George Bush I appointed him and he
basically served George Bush II with a landmark suit to try get at the
information behind the development of the Bush energy policy.
Technically, he is suing Vice President Cheney, but you get the
picture. This is definitely an indication of independence on the part
of the GAO.
The other major problem we have is standard setting. Accounting
standards to most of you are probably a nightmare. They are a
nightmare to us. They are a law. I mean, fundamentally they are a
law and they’re set by what is a political body.
33
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) is a private
non-profit institution that is funded by what’s called the Financial
Accounting Foundation. The Financial Accounting Foundation gets
all its money from corporations and accounting firms and it is
responsible for setting these standards. It has absolutely no force of
law. It gets its force of law, because the SEC says if you want to do
business in the United States you got to go by their rules.
Well, let’s take stock options and the problem that they generated.
The FASB was trying to come up in the mid-1990s with a
pronouncement on stock options. The fundamental problem of
accountants is that we are the reality check. We’re there to bring the
party down to reality and try to say, “What is the true economic
essence of these transactions that you’re creating?” Well, stock
options are a classic example.
In the mid-1990s the Financial Accounting Board said, “You’re
paying people for services rendered. That’s an expense. It should
show up on your income statement as an expense. It doesn’t make
any difference whether you’re paying them with cash, or paying them
with cars, or paying them with perks, or paying them with stock
options. The economic essence is you’re paying somebody for
services rendered. That’s an expense, that’s a wage, and that should
go on the income statement.”
Of course if you do that, companies like eBay and Yahoo would go
from making money to losing money very quickly, because it’s a
significant expense, particularly for the high-tech industry. As a
33. See id. at 644 (defining the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as
“[t]he independent body of accountants responsible for establishing, interpreting,
and improving standards for financial accounting and reporting.”).
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result, the industries rebelled. They even lobbied Congress, and Joe
34
Lieberman introduced a bill in Congress. I’m not sure of all the
technical details, but fundamentally Congress got on board and
pretty soon the Financial Accounting Standards Board backed off.
There is a standard out there that says you’ve got to expense stock
35
option compensations. But you have a choice: (1) you can either
expense them in the income statement, where it’s right there in front
of everybody and it cuts your earnings per share that the stock market
36
looks at; or (2) you can put it off in the footnotes and tell everybody
what it would look like if you had expensed it. The information is all
37
there. But our great, efficient markets really don’t see it when it’s in
the footnotes. It’s got to be in that income.
38
If we really believe the efficient markets hypothesis, who would
care whether the information was in the footnotes or the financial
statement? I can guarantee you, industry cared a lot, enough to lobby
the Financial Accounting Standards Board into pulling back from
that standard.
The other part of the puzzle that needs to be seriously addressed is
the impact of political pressure on the accounting standard setting
body. What kind of scares me a little bit is that one of the calls that is
now out there is for accounting standards to go the way of the
international accounting standards. This is where we get into some
conceptual stuff.
The international accounting standards are what is called
principles-based. The American accounting standards are what is
called rules-based, which means that the American accounting
34. See S. 1175, 103d Cong. § 4 (1993) (prohibiting charging options as expenses
on balance sheets).
35. See David Tice, Employee Stock Option Costs Don’t Show on Bottom Line: Lax
Accounting Standards help Companies Hide Big Expenses, ON WALL STREET, Jan. 1, 1999
(describing Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 123, which provides
corporations with two options for reporting the costs of employee stock options);
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 123 (Federal Accounting Standards Bd. 1995) [hereinafter Statement
123].
36. See Statement 123 (suggesting that companies will rarely report the costs of
stock options in their income statements because the alternative allows the
companies to hide this information in footnotes). On December 31, 2002, FASB
amended Statement 123 with Statement 148 which provides two supplemental means
of expensing stock options.
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION—
TRANSITION AND DISCLOSURE, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 148
(Federal Accounting Standards Bd. 2002) [hereinafter Statement 148]. Statement
148 also requires that companies improve the clarity and prominence of disclosures
so that they are easier to find and understand. See id.
37. See id. (stating that all the information regarding stock-option compensation
be included in a company’s expense report).
38. See Tam, supra note 18 and accompanying text (defining the efficient market
hypothesis).
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standards are thick, and they’re very, very detailed.
The problem you get into is that the auditor-client discussion turns
into a very detailed legalistic argument. It really boils down to the
client saying, “Why can’t I do this? Show me something specific in
the rule book that says, I can’t do this.” The auditors try to go to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and say, “Well, you got to give
us some guidance so we can hang our hat on something here.”
Then, of course, the Accounting Standards Board tends to get
heavily lobbied by industry and tends to back off. As a matter of fact,
the accounting firms tend to lobby the Financial Accounting
Standards Board for their clients. Some of the studies that have been
done in academic accounting look at the lobbying behavior of the
39
“Big Five,” now four, Certified Public Accounting (“CPA”) firms and
they’re almost parallel to the lobbying activity of their major clients.
You can say that they really are in bed with each other. But, as I’ve
explained, that’s a pretty natural behavior.
I’m a little bit leery about how to do this, but the other piece of the
puzzle is to find some way to isolate the Financial Accounting
Standards Board from the tremendous lobbying that comes in from
industry and the funding that comes in from industry and the fact
that four out of the five members on the Financial Accounting
Standards Board come from industry, either from corporations or
40
from the accounting firms.
There is only one member of the board that has to come from
41
academia, because the American Accounting Association, which is
our academic group, is a sponsoring organization and insisted on
that.
So basically, that’s kind of my story. It is that I think the system is
fundamentally flawed in that when you’ve got an economic situation
where the consumer cannot assess the quality of the product, where
the consumer is so distant from the actual purchase transaction—and
39. Arthur Andersen fell from the ranks of the “Big Five” accounting firms,
leaving Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP,
and KPMG LLP as the “Final Four” premier accounting firm. Weil et al., supra note
21, at A1.
40. The Financial Accounting Standards Board is comprised of seven members,
who “are required to sever all connections with the firms or institutions they served
prior to joining the Board.” Financial Accounting Standards Board Website, FASB
Facts: Board Members, at http://www.fasb.org/facts/bd_members_staff.shtml (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003). Of the seven members, four had previously worked in
industry. Id.
41. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 81 (defining the American
Accounting Association as “[a]n organization of accounting practitioners, educators,
and students.”). The American Accounting Association promotes accounting as an
academic discipline by sponsoring research products and continuing education
seminars. Id.

PANEL 1.PRINTER.DOC

2003]

5/14/2003 3:03 PM

PANEL 1

595

here the consumer is not just the stockholders.
Our stock market has changed radically since the 1920s and 1930s.
Today, everybody is a stockholder. Your 401(k) declined, so did
mine. I imagine everybody in this room, or the vast majority of you
have money in the stock market someplace. You are the consumers
of financial information. You are the people who benefit from
accurate, reliable accounting information.
But you’re not the ones who are hiring the accountants. You’re
not the ones who are evaluating the quality of their work and you’re
not the ones who are making the decisions on how much they should
be compensated.
The problem is that you probably would be clueless as to how to
evaluate the quality of an audit. That’s why before the turn of the last
century there were these anti-competitive practices.
The
fundamental belief was that free markets will not work in these kinds
of professions, in legal, medical, and accounting professions, because
the consumer is incapable of judging the quality of the product and
therefore we need to look at this as a social good.
What competition is going to do is create a race to the bottom,
because it’s going to emphasize cost reduction and that’s exactly
what’s happened in auditing.
This is where my liberal politics come out. Until we can realize that
accurate financial information is critical to our society and that that is
a social good that probably cannot be adequately allocated within a
free market, we have to make some fundamental change in the way
auditors are hired, compensated, and evaluated.
Although some of my auditor colleagues would shoot me for saying
that, I think if they really stepped back and looked at it a little bit
more objectively, I think that they would find that it would upgrade
the quality of the audit and it would probably increase their fees, and
turn it back into a profession where they can really meet their social
obligation. Thank you.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Jim, thank you very much. Chuck?
MR. DAVIDOW: Thank you very much. I think that the two talks
we’ve had so far have been very useful in describing what some of the
pressures are that the system places on the various participants. I
want to step back from that for just a minute and talk a little bit about
a narrower set of issues.
That is, what is it that happened in the case of the scandals that
we’ve been reading about over the last year, so that we can build from
that? Once we have talked about what the problem is, what are the
solutions that would address those problems?
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I think it is particularly important because some of the solutions
that we’ve read about seem to me to be interesting, provocative,
maybe good things, but not to relate to the particular problems that
we’re dealing with here. So, let me take it in that narrower way.
My involvement started almost exactly a year ago, when we were
hired by a special committee of the Board of Directors of Enron to
come in and do an internal investigation and prepare a report which
42
was ultimately made public and called the Powers Report because
Dean Bill Powers from the University of Texas chaired our
committee.
Since Enron there have been a number of other public scandals
including Tyco, Global Crossing, Adelphia, and WorldCom. In
WorldCom we were hired a few months ago to perform the same
role—which is to come in and investigate exactly what happened in
contemplation that we’ll publish a report that will describe what the
facts are.
It has been very illuminating, not only because it gave me the
chance to sit in a room with Ken Lay and with Andy Fastow and with
the others and ask them the questions, but also because it forced us
to learn about transactions which, as Jim said, in the case of Enron
were enormously complicated transactions.
I do complicated
transactions for a living and the Raptor transactions there took me
the better part of a month before I was comfortable that I had any
43
idea what they were all about.
In each of those cases, things went wrong, but they weren’t the
same thing in each of those cases. Each one of them involved
separate types of problems. In some cases, they were the sort of thing
that are pretty simple and you learned in kindergarten you weren’t
supposed to do—steal from other people, for example. Others of
them were very complicated and involved efforts by people to—I
won’t even say game the rules—but try to look at the rules and figure
out a way, without violating them, to get around them, to defeat the
purpose of the rules.
42. See WILLIAM C. POWERS ET AL., ENRON BD. OF DIRS., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP.
(2002) [hereinafter POWERS REPORT] (identifying William C. Powers, Jr. as the
Chairman of the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron
Corporation, which was created to investigate transactions and investment
partnerships created by Enron’s former Executive Vice President and CFO and other
Enron employees), at http://www.nysscpa.org/enron/report.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2003).
43. See id. at 97-128 (addressing Enron’s complex “Raptor transactions,” which
allowed the company to avoid reflecting almost $1 billion in losses on its income
statement), at http://www.nysscpa.org/enron/Powersreport3.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2003).

THE
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Indeed to the point I think it’s fair to say that at least in Enron, it
wasn’t a situation where you would go in and people would want to
hide from you what they had done. In many cases, people were
proud of it because they thought they had come up with an artistic
and creative triumph, a way to interpret accounting rules that was
both permissible, yet achieved some sort of counter-intuitive result.
As we put it in describing it internally, someone thought he had
figured out how to turn lead into gold and thought that it was just the
neatest thing that had ever happened.
Ultimately we disagreed with them, as have the members of the
criminal task force that are examining it. But it’s a very different
problem from someone saying, “I’m going to figure out a way to
enter into a transaction where I make a bunch of money and
nobody’s the wiser for it, or where I get to buy a bunch of property
but have the company pay for it.”
Without going deeply into the particulars, there are a few common
aspects that I think these different scandals have. One, and the most
important one, has to do with culture. There is nothing more
important than the culture of an organization. One of the things
that is really striking in each of the scandals I have talked about is that
it wasn’t a case of someone embezzling money and hiding it from
everybody else there. These were all situations in which lots of
people knew what was going on.
It’s right there in front of you. Based on the public statements by
44
WorldCom, capitalizing line costs,
something that’s clearly
impermissible, you have to ask yourself, “How could a number of
people have seen that and no one said, ‘Wait a minute, this is wrong,
you can’t do that.’”
In cases where there was looting, how can a bunch of people in the
company who saw it not have said, “Wait a minute, you’ve got to
stop.” What kind of culture is it in an organization that permits that
kind of conduct to occur, and no one raises their hand and says—in a
way that actually accomplishes anything—“Stop, it can’t go on any
longer.”
Cultures like that don’t grow up immediately. But if you look at
the companies, one thing you will find is they have tended to be
relatively new companies, companies that don’t have long histories.
They tend to be companies where the CEO or the very top people are
44. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT
ACCOUNTING NOW—OR ELSE!, BEHIND THE NUMBERS: A REVIEW OF SIX ACCOUNTING
PROBLEM AREAS IN THE NEWS 627 (2002) (explaining that “‘line costs’ represent fees
that WorldCom paid to third party telecommunication network providers for the
right to access the third parties’ networks.”).
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viewed as super heroes.
The way most organizations work is they thrive because a number
of people who are working together in a way to build the
organization. When you have a company where people say, “We’re a
great company, and we’re a great company because we’ve got the
greatest CEO on earth, and we depend on him, and we don’t need to
think about who the successor is because no one could possibly stand
in the shoes of this person,” you’re asking for trouble. You’re
creating an environment where it’s very hard for anyone to challenge
that person.
It often is the case that those are the companies where that CEO
has a very large influence over the board, the kind of problem we
were just talking about before as well. Situations where there is an,
authoritarian is too strong a word, but a very strong central figure,
where dissent is not encouraged, where there is a view that your
compensation comes from showing loyalty to the person you report
to or to the boss rather than from long-term performance, where
compensation comes from closing a great deal rather than waiting to
see how it pans out over a period of time. This tends to encourage
short-term type of conduct that it seems to me has been characteristic
in all of these cases.
The first thing that I would focus on is culture. If I were a member
of a board of directors or an audit committee, that’s the thing I
would be focusing on the most too. Not merely listening to the
presentation of the CEO and the CFO, and leaving it at that, but
actually getting to know people throughout the organization.
The second thing that I think has been a common problem in a
number of these cases, and it’s been a failing of lawyers as well, comes
down to this basic proposition: if you’re asked to evaluate something,
you have to understand it first.
That seems like an obvious proposition. But to pick perhaps
unfairly on one case, there has been a lot of criticism of the
investigation that Vinson & Elkins did of the so-called whistleblower
45
allegations from Sherron Watkins.
As that has been described, a woman who worked for Enron sent
an anonymous letter to Ken Lay, the Chairman. He received it and
gave it to the General Counsel. The General Counsel asked Vinson &
Elkins to come in and take a preliminary look at it to decide if it was
45. See generally Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year: The
Whistleblowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30 (describing the circumstances surrounding
Watkins’ actions at Enron and naming her one of the persons of the year), available
at http://www.time.com/personoftheyear/2002/poyintro.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2003).
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something that required further examination.
There are an assortment of issues about whether that was the right
choice or the right firm. That is really not to the point that I want to
discuss. It’s that what Vinson & Elkins was told, according to all who
were involved, was “just take a preliminary look at this so that we can
decide whether we need to do more. You don’t need to get behind
the accounting.”
It’s very hard to evaluate a letter that says there is an accounting
fraud here without getting behind the accounting or at least looking
into the accounting. But that was the nature of the assignment that
was given. I don’t know how you do an assignment like that.
We were asked to come in and examine Enron just as we’ve been
asked to come in and examine WorldCom. It’s very complicated, and
it takes a lot of time and in the end there may well be parts of it that
we got wrong or that we get wrong because it’s very complicated.
I don’t understand how you can come in and say, “I’m going to
investigate this situation and give my client the answer that it needs”
if you haven’t had the opportunity to actually get to the bottom of it
and satisfy yourself that you understand what you’re doing.
It has come up in a variety of other aspects of each of these
scandals, but it has been essentially that people have been brought
into a situation that they probably thought was okay. In Enron, I
would venture that the people who received that anonymous letter
thought that this was some sort of crackpot.
I’ve seen plenty of whistleblower letters, and I’ve read plenty of
articles in the newspaper that are hostile, and in some cases the letter
writer is a crackpot. You look at them and you say, “I’m not sure how
big of an investigation we need to do to figure whether the CEO
really is intercepting the brain waves of this person who works in the
accounting department.” You say, “Okay, that one, I’m not going to
spend a lot of time on.”
But on the other hand, when someone says, “This complicated set
of accounting transactions is enabling, in effect, the company to
record income based on increases of the value of its own stock,” that’s
not something where you do not just say to yourself, “Geez, this is
some kook.” That’s something you take a look at. You have to make
an evaluation of what needs to be done, but you have to bring
skepticism to the process as well. You have to come into it assuming
that there may be something here.
In the case of Enron, there were two or three published articles in
the six or eight months before Enron imploded in which people said
things along the lines of, “There is a significant problem here. They
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are doing very complicated transactions. They are not explaining
46
them. It looks like smoke and mirrors.”
Plenty of people saw those columns. Indeed Enron responded to
47
them. The people in management wanted to portray the analyst as
an idiot, someone who doesn’t understand what the company was
doing. It turns out she was right.
The reason that those warnings were not heeded was not, I think,
because people said, “We’re engaged in a fraud, let’s continue
covering it up.” We interviewed Bob Jaedicke, the Chairman of the
48
Audit Committee, as well as a number of other people. They are
honorable people who I believe were trying to do their jobs right.
One of the failures here is acceptance of what management tells
you based on the trust that you’ve built up over years. It's
understandable and not an entirely bad thing. To the extent when
you hear something that should engender skepticism or at least a
close second look, people were disinclined to do it for a variety of
reasons.
The next issue I want to mention has to do with disclosure; that is a
function that lawyers are very much involved in. My work has
generally been in litigation defense and enforcement proceedings,
investigations, and not in drafting disclosure. It’s easy for me to sit
here and challenge something that’s often quite difficult to do.
But if you read over the disclosure in Enron’s 10-K for the year
49
2001, there is a footnote on related party disclosure. It’s about two
paragraphs long. It includes disclosure of almost all of the elements
50
of these Raptor transactions that I referred to before. When I read
46. See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001 (detailing
concerns about Enron's earnings and stock price before its declaration of
bankruptcy); Peter Eavis, Why One Firm Thinks Enron is Running Out of Gas,
THESTREET.COM, May 9, 2001 (discussing a research firm’s recommendation to sell
Enron stock as it believed, correctly, that the company was faring much poorer than
its published reports), available at http://www.thestreet.com/_tscs/comment/detox/
1422781.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
47. See Good-bye Houston, Hello Federal Prison: Enron Executives Should Get Ready to
Move to Their New Home, THE COPERNICUS MZINE, Feb. 2002 (reporting that Enron
CEO Jeffrey Skilling degraded Bethany McLean of Fortune Magazine for delving too
far into Enron's business practices), available at http://www.copernicus
marketing.com/about/mzine/monthlyeds/feb02.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
48. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
49. See ENRON ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000
(FORM 10-K) 76 n.16 (2001) (describing transactions entered into by Enron with
limited partnerships “whose general partner’s managing member is a senior officer
at Enron”), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401015000
10/0001024401-01-500010.txt (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
50. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 42, at 97-128 and accompanying text
(describing Enron’s related party disclosures).
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through it after I understand the transactions, the pieces of it are all
there, but it’s totally incomprehensible. You can’t read it and come
up with an answer, “Why are you doing this transaction? What’s the
purpose of it? How do these different pieces fit together? What are
you trying to accomplish here?”
I suspect, although I can’t prove, that someone, at some time,
thought that was a masterpiece of drafting. That it had disclosed all
the things they had to disclose. It had all the pieces there. It was
truthful. It's hard to find statements that you can look at it and say,
“Aha, that’s a lie!” But it didn’t perform the basic purpose, which is to
treat the shareholders as owners and give them a basis to decide
whether they like what their company is doing or not.
This is something that I think has been evolving over time. It’s
partly a result of the fact that transactions are very complicated. It’s
partly the result of the fact that it’s difficult to explain them in a way
that’s understandable.
The result has been some kind of
gamesmanship. But an important role for the people doing financial
disclosure, including the lawyers, is to take a look at it and say, “I
don’t understand it. It doesn’t make sense.”
I picture members of the audit committee and members of the
board who signed the document sitting as they probably will be
someday, if they haven’t been already, in one of those little basement
conference rooms at the SEC on plastic chairs with someone three
years out of law school asking them questions, saying, “I read this
language here. You signed it. What does it mean? Do you
understand it?” I wouldn’t want to be in the position of having to
answer those questions.
Stepping back and taking the view of not have we put the facts in
here technically, but have we written something that’s actually
understandable, would, I think, have led to the discovery and end of
virtually all of these scandals. Once you read about them in the New
York Times or heard about them in congressional hearings, it was
obvious to everybody that bad things had happened here.
If the transactions had been described earlier, I think the fraud
would have been discovered earlier. Although I must say, analysts
whose job it is to figure out what’s there could have done a whole lot
more based on that technically accurate disclosure.
The last point I want to make with respect to the lessons that I take
from these scandals has to do with the role of the lawyer. In an
adversary system, one of the things that we are taught all along is that
it is our job to carry out the desires of our client and to do so in a
lawful way, but to be their advocate.
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Being the person who says no is not a good position to be in. It’s
uncomfortable in many cases. Often part of the task is figuring out a
way to say yes, but do it lawfully.
Nonetheless, there is an enormous temptation to do what your
client wants you to do, to try and say yes. In part, this is because the
client pays your bills and does not have to hire you again if
management is unhappy with the work you’ve done. In part, because
you work with people. You’re a team player. You see yourself that
way and you want to be able to get things accomplished.
But you’re not always doing yourself a favor and you’re not doing
your client, the corporation, a favor. In many cases, you’re not even
doing the manager that you’re talking to a favor if you don’t bring
the independence of mind to the task that’s needed.
When you talk to the people who were the top management even
at Enron, not the people who were stealing money, but the people
who were behind these transactions, my guess is that they are saying
to themselves, probably with at least a grain of truth, I asked the
lawyers if this was okay and if it wasn’t, they needed to tell me, “No.”
They might well not have received that “no” answer very happily at
the time. I’ve had the experience with a couple of very strong-willed
clients who have said, “I want to do this, or that, or the other thing.” I
have said, “No, you can’t do that.” The two I’m thinking of are two of
my clients who are most loyal to me today, because I think their view
is that it kept them out of trouble.
Getting past the desire to please your client in the short-term and,
on to the longer term, doing what’s best for the corporate client, its
managers, and your individual client is a critically important part of
the role of the lawyer. You need to bear this in mind even when
there is a temptation to forget about it for a few minutes.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Good. Thank you, Chuck. Questions?
Yes, please.
SPEAKER: You’re talking about alternatives to hiring auditors and
I wonder if you thought it was appropriate [portion of question
inaudible] insurance companies [portion of question inaudible]
because they’re the ones that have their money [portion of question
inaudible].
PROFESSOR PETERS: Frankly I haven’t heard that proposal,
which means I ought to read the newspaper more frequently. My
initial reaction is that I’d be a little bit concerned, because the
insurance company has money on the line. But its money is on the
line for certain specific risks like liability and fire damage, et cetera.
I’m not sure that an insurance company would have to pay off if a

PANEL 1.PRINTER.DOC

2003]

5/14/2003 3:03 PM

PANEL 1

603

company’s stock price plummeted because they were caught cooking
the books. Therefore, the incentive on the insurance company might
be a little limited in terms of really speaking for the shareholders.
That would be my main concern that they would look after their own
pocketbooks and their own pocketbooks may not be aligned with the
stockholders.’
MR. DAVIDOW: I share that view. A company’s insurers have a set
of incentives of their own. It’s true that they have a desire to have
accurate as opposed to inaccurate information. On the other hand,
if they have doubts about the information, they can solve the problem
by canceling the policy or not renewing the policy. It is probably
more in their interest to do that than to cause disclosure which is
going to bring about a bunch of lawsuits in which the insurance
company will be on the line to pay the defense costs or possibly the
judgments in those lawsuits. There would need to be an alignment of
interests to make that work.
PROFESSOR PETERS: Yes, sir.
SPEAKER: [Question inaudible].
MR. DAVIDOW: The solution of Sarbanes-Oxley is addressing the
problems that I see as the most important ones now.
To the extent Sarbanes-Oxley is saying that you need to remember
that your client is the corporation, that you may need to go up to the
board, that’s a good thing, not a bad thing, as a reminder.
But I don’t think it was the case in any of these scandals, that what
you had was a lawyer sitting in his or her office saying, “There is
something terrible here, what do I do? Who do I go to? What do I
do about it?”
The problems in these cases tend to be more along the lines of
what I described before, lawyers throwing themselves into the effort
wholeheartedly and bringing about the things they were trying to
bring about. The first question I have in my own mind is whether
Sarbanes-Oxley is the solution to the particular problem that we have.
I do worry, just as you say, that the result will not be to give the
lawyer more leverage. Lawyers have a lot of leverage as it is. You may
get fired for it, but you can make your client very uncomfortable if
they’re doing something wrong and you threaten to go up the line,
whether or not the law says you have to go up the line.
I worry that what you’re going to end up generating, though, is a
series of CYA-type communications going back and forth. It may be
the client doesn’t share information or it may be the lawyer sends a
letter to the general counsel saying, “We have received evidence, x, y,
and z.” The general counsel has to figure out how to send a letter
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back that covers his rear end. You wind up with a process that creates
an antagonism between the two rather than the kind cooperation
that you really want to have.
That’s all speculative. It may be—and I’m genuinely open to this—
that reminding lawyers and pushing them to escalate issues when they
have them will in the end be a good thing. I haven’t really made up
my own mind.
SPEAKER: [Question inaudible].
MR. DAVIDOW: I’m not sure that you need protection to take a
concern up with your client. You’re not going to get sued for
malpractice for having brought something to the attention of the
general counsel.
Maybe the place that we should be focusing here is on the
proposed rule requiring the lawyer to bring an issue to the
government. That is controversial. That’s a place where you, as a
lawyer, could be viewed as taking action that’s inconsistent with what
has often been viewed as the role of the lawyer.
It may well be that making this sort of reporting mandatory does
give some cover in a situation where lawyers feel that they have been
used to give an opinion that has then been used in an offering
document and they come to conclude that their opinion is wrong
because they were misled. They have to say to themselves, “Now what
do I do? Do I go to the SEC to tell them that it’s wrong or not?”
Making it compulsory may help in that setting.
But in the normal back and forth between client and law firm it’s
always seemed to me that lawyers with the appropriate independence
of mind know how to make themselves effectively heard already. But
making it clearer is not a bad thing in my mind.
MR. GUNDERSON: If I could address the in-house question,
because I think there probably was a component of that to your
question. I think it is probably more important for in-house counsel
than for outside counsel. Outside counsel, I believe, is legitimately
worrying about communication and what’s going to happen to
communication and the openness. For in-house counsel, under the
51
Model Rules, we’ve traditionally had a choice between bumping it
up. If you’re not the general counsel, you know you have to evaluate
whether the general counsel dealing with it or not.
If they are not dealing with it, then you have two choices, resign or
kick it up yourself. At the general counsel level, then the general
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (requiring in-house
counsel to contact a higher authority if illegal activity within the company is
suspected, also known as “climbing the corporate ladder”).
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counsel is talking to the CEO and he’s got that choice. Is the CEO
understanding and dealing with it? If not, kick it up to the board of
directors or resign.
Those are both very powerful tools. You have to be willing to use
both of them and they may amount to the same thing. Because if you
cannot get along with your CEO, he doesn’t just gratuitously fire you.
It’s a big deal for the CEO to be firing his general counsel and it’s a
big deal for the board. But the prospect that you’re going to be able
52
to work together after that is questionable.
I think it’s been useful, though. At the American Corporate
53
Counsel Association, we would debate these things. You had some
in-house counsel who said, “The Model Rules are a joke. We don’t
54
do that. We do what we’re told.”
Others responded, “Are you
kidding?” Again, they’re talking about what happens to them, you
know, if they do this.
I think for that group, constituency within the in-house bar, this is
very important because it says, “Sorry, debate is over. This is the way
it is.” I think it’s public opinion as well. I think the coverage of
Enron and what went on in-house has helped that.
The general counsel wants to be able to say to the CEO, “Look, I’m
doing this because it’s my duty to do this. I’ve got to do this. I’m
doing this. No hard feelings. It’s not personal. I’ve got to do this
and we’ve got to get it to the board or all kinds of people have
problems.” It’s a bit like the auditors looking for cover. It’s right
there. It’s in black and white, and the CEO has read about it in the
paper.
52. See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 37-38 (2002) (“In any event, the general counsel will pay a
substantial price for going around the CEO. At a minimum, such action will disturb
the relationship of the CEO and the general counsel.”).
53. See generally American Corporate Counsel Association Website (describing
the American Corporate Counsel Association as “[a]n effective voice on issues of
importance to the corporate legal community,” most specifically in-house counsel),
at http://www.acca.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
54. See Role of the General Counsel, ACCA DOCKET (September/October 1996) (“In
discussing the role of general counsel as corporate cop, it was clear that the group
hated adopting that role. It puts us in a no-win position since there is an inherent
tension between the roles of adviser and enforcer. To enforce, the general counsel
must compromise the trust and credibility needed to be an effective adviser. All
general counsel fear this role as one with the potential for precipitating a career
defining moment in which the general counsel must resign or be fired.”). However,
as an organization, the American Corporate Counsel Association has stated clearly its
policy on the responsibility of a general counsel. See In-House Counsel’s Role in
Ensuring Corporate Responsibility, ACCA POLICY STATEMENT (2002) (“If [seeking to
resolve the issue internally does] not result in appropriate action to resolve an issue
of material impact on the entity, the attorney must take the matter to the board or an
appropriate sub-group of the board.”), available at http://www.acca.com/advocacy/
corpresponspolicy.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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I think it’s got a very positive effect that I have seen, not just in the
companies I have worked with, but with my colleagues who work in
other companies.
You have middle-level lawyers who are saying, “Well, under
Sarbanes-Oxley, don’t I have to do something?” Because they’ve seen
something that they didn’t think about as hard as this before. I think
it’s actually quite favorable on the in-house side but presents some
communications problems in the relationship with outside counsel.
Outside counsel has got to do it through the general counsel or you
really have a messed up situation.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Professor?
SPEAKER: [Portion of comment inaudible] the 2001 version of
55
the SEC’s rule [portion of comment inaudible] I think in place at
the time that Enron [portion of comment inaudible] that the result
would have been [portion of comment inaudible].
MR. DAVIDOW: I can give him a quick yes on the first one. After
that I haven’t seen anything that suggests that anything different
would have occurred had this been in place.
SPEAKER: That’s my instinct.
MR. GUNDERSON: Well, I believe that the mid-level attorney who
56
had hired Fried Frank would have had a lot more going for him. He
was in a very difficult situation because there did not seem to be a
strong functional line up to the General Counsel. That did not seem
to be the operative chain. It seemed to be the Chief Financial Officer
was in effect able to dominate decisions about whether what that guy
was doing was appropriate or not. I think that the new rules would
have helped in that sense.
SPEAKER: The second question is whether the state law was more
[remainder of question inaudible].
MR. GUNDERSON: I think the whole notion of federalizing
corporate governance is a very problematic issue. The business57
judgment rule, the whole regime around corporate governance,
55. See SEC Procedural Rule 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (2003) (authorizing the
SEC to regulate lawyers appearing before it based on their professional conduct).
56. See Jake Tapper, More than One Enron Official Warned Company About Growing
Crisis, SALON.COM, Jan. 18, 2002 (reporting that Enron Staff Attorney Jordan Mintz,
before Enron was forced to reveal its actual finances, hired outside counsel from New
York law firm Fried Frank Harris Shiver & Jacobson to look into what he thought
were questionable partnerships created by Enron), at http://archive.salon.com/
tech/feature/2002/01/18/enron_partnerships/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2003). Fried
Frank advised Enron to stop setting up these partnership. Id.
57. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 192 (defining the businessjudgment rule as “[t]he presumption that in making business decisions not involving
self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best
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under state law, is what directors are familiar with. I think it can be
made to work.
On top of that, to add federalizing attorney ethics, where we
already had to deal with the Model Rules versus our home state’s
rules, I would say it should be done by the state because that’s the
normal place [for] both of those.
SPEAKER: Would you tighten state corporate law to deal with
[remainder of question inaudible].
MR. GUNDERSON: Our system, when it works, is two-fold. First,
what do directors need to do to be doing their job right vis-à-vis the
company? Second, is a system where the shareholders have what they
need to know to make a decision as to whether to invest or not.
I think what you’re describing actually does fit more on the
disclosure side of the regime which is a federal regime, as opposed to
legislating the proper way to deal with situations, and is very difficult.
Legislating what you have to talk about so that the market can make
decisions in these areas it is more straightforward.
I was more commenting on the ethics. The professional ethics and
what lawyers are supposed to do belongs in the states. The ABA and
the Model Rules just did not get enough airing; they were not really
adopted by in-house counsel to the extent they should have been.
SPEAKER: My concern was focusing on the management side
rather than the lawyer side [remainder of question inaudible].
MR. GUNDERSON: A lot of these companies were violating the
law in not disclosing related party transactions. The law was already
there and they were just flat out violating them and if they had been
disclosing the related party transactions, with Fastow’s interest in
those companies, anybody could have looked at that and said, this is
insane. That’s my view.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Thank you.
SPEAKER: I have a slightly more, I guess, philosophical question.
You mentioned in your comments about the importance of
organizational culture and I wonder if [portion of question
inaudible] in the corporate model. I raise that question not because
I question the existence of corporate culture or organization culture
but I always feel, to make a reference to Steven Spielberg, it sort of
feels like a “force.”
It’s sort of this thing that drives the protagonists either to do good
or to do evil. But do we harness it to correct problems in the future?
interest.”). “The rule shields directors and officers from liability for unprofitable or
harmful corporate transactions if the transactions were made in good faith, due care,
and within the directors’ or officers’ authority.” Id.
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I raise that question because it seems to me that the law is how we
harness and drive that culture. It doesn’t seem to be working
[portion of question inaudible].
Also, I think with sort of a broader cultural phenomena which is
[portion of question inaudible], auditing, that you raised, the legal
profession, to business in general. It’s much more about producing
and selling and not necessarily a family profession any longer. How
do we harness corporate culture?
MR. GUNDERSON: If you look at the companies that had these
big problems there are some similarities among them. One of them
is that they were radically changing companies, tremendous growth
companies, big acquisitions so that there wasn’t much chance for
them to have good corporate culture.
I think you need to look at companies in that category. There are
certain areas where governance really matters, and that’s one of
them—where you see a company that you can’t really expect to have
a good mature company culture.
The one we always like to refer to, General Electric (“GE”), I mean
after the 1929 crash, when people were looking to inspiration from
captains of industry, it was GE’s Chairman in the 1930s who was
guiding. That’s a company that has a strong company culture.
There can be problems at the top, you know, but that’s not
affecting the rank and file. That’s not really driving the way a
company—and most—I think the markets do have a sense of what are
strong companies with good company culture because they are, the
analysts and the directors are, meeting middle management.
I mean that’s a whole side, a practical side of governance where the
board does get exposure to the management and does see that it
does have a strong culture, and I mean, involving ethics and all of
that. That is far more powerful than anything else you can put in
place. I mean, if it’s there, that’s great. If it’s not there, all these
other substitutes like the law, the board, and everything else, they’re
pretty poor substitutes.
SPEAKER: I agree with you. I just think that’s the problem. How
do we get there? I mean it seems to me to be a very intricate process.
MR. GUNDERSON: It is and it takes time. I mean, you don’t get it
overnight. Many of these companies were overnight sensations.
PROFESSOR PETERS: The market does discipline companies for
breaches of corporate culture. I mean after all these things blew up
other companies that started to revise their earnings were penalized
in the market because these accounting things came out. So, I think
one piece is to try to deal with this disclosure issue, to let the market
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know what kind of corporate culture you have.
I think there are two other parties here, and we need to be careful,
that are parties to the corporate process that also have some serious
conflicts of interests.
One is the analyst community, which the Attorney General of New
58
York has kind of gone after, and the conflict of interest between the
investment bankers and the analysts. The analysts are supposed to be
kind of independent purveyors of information to the market and we
find that they are being heavily influenced by the investment banking
community.
The other is the stockholders themselves. A lot of the stockholders
are large institutional stockholders, pension plans and things like
that, that also have a conflict of interest. When Hewlett-Packard and
Compaq were discussing a merger, one of the major stockholders—
and I can’t remember which company it was—was also the manager
of one of the company’s pension plans.
So you have investors who have conflicts of interest because on the
one hand they’re investing in stock, but on the other hand they are
managing 401(k) plans. Actually there were some e-mails and letters
going around in that merger that put pressure on this one investment
company to switch sides in the merger, kind of as a promise to keep
management of the pension plan.
So disclosure also has to include some of the conflicts of interest
that are going on in the mechanisms that are supposed to be
providing objective information to the market. It’s not just the
auditors that are involved with that.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Let me ask about another actor—prison.
Are we going to need much more of this or is one big burst enough?
The role of sort of the criminalization of the securities and corporate
law. I wanted to get your take on the extent that this actor needs to
be very present much anymore. We’ve had some participation so far.
58. See Charles Gasparino & Michael Schroeder, Pitt and Spitzer Butted Heads to
Overhaul Wall Street Research, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at A1 (“Over the past year, Mr.
Spitzer has transformed the New York State attorney general’s office into a de facto
federal regulator of the securities markets. His weapon: The Martin Act, a onceobscure state law that gives him broad power to charge Wall Street firms with civiland possibly criminal-fraud violations.”); Pradnya Joshi, Merrill Lynch Set to Pay
$100M: Also agrees to new safeguards to settle Spitzer probe of analysts, NEWSDAY, May 22,
2002, at A7 (detailing the settlement between Merrill Lynch and the New York
Attorney General where Merrill Lynch agreed to pay a $100 million penalty, institute
reforms, and issue an apology for “‘inappropriate communication’”). See generally
Office of NYS Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Biography of Eliot Spitzer (stating that
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer is “a national leader in investor
protection” and “Spitzer’s investigations of conflicts of interest on Wall Street have
been the catalyst for dramatic reform in the nation’s financial services industry”), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bio.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
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MR. GUNDERSON: You send people to prison when you’re really
mad and actually you need somebody to blame for it. You don’t want
to blame yourself. We had so many of these just astounding scandals.
Somebody will probably figure out what the cycle is. National Student
59
Marketing, before that, after that.
It has so much to do with the state of the market. I mean when the
drinks are free, nobody shoots the bartender. When the drinks
aren’t free you take him out and shoot him. So I think the market is
going to turn around and I think we will have incrementally
improved things. I think that later we’ll hear from the panel about
the evolution of corporate governance and where we’re going.
But I think that telling these guys they can’t turn themselves in—
“We’re going to put you in handcuffs and march you down.” I mean
all of that. I mean that’s more of a signal that we’re taking care of the
problem than anything else.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Absolutely.
MR. GUNDERSON: It’s more political than anything else.
PROFESSOR PETERS: It would be nice to see Michael Milken’s
personal financial statements today after his—I mean that was the
other scandal in the 1980s when the savings and loan went down and
60
he did go to prison. As I understand it, he has made quite a bunch
of money since prison. He’s come back out a fairly wealthy man.
MR. DAVIDOW: I take a different view on this one. I think it’s an
absolutely great thing to send people to prison.
Typically, financial frauds have been dealt with by the SEC. The
61
SEC has a respectable arsenal of weapons available to it but none of
them come anywhere close to prison, particularly where people can
make tens or hundreds of millions of dollars through fraud.
If the SEC enjoins them from going out and doing it again, if it
imposes a bar from serving as officer or director of a public company,
59. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342,
345 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (recounting that Wachovia purchased “five million dollars
worth of NSMC stock from the corporation and two of its directors” and that the
stock’s market price dropped by sixty percent two months after the purchase because
NSMC announced that it excepted to report a loss for the previous quarter).
60. See generally JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL: THE CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN (1992) (providing an in-depth look at the life of the
infamous Michael Milken and his involvement in the Saving & Loan scandals).
61. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.2, at 865-91
(4th ed. 2002) (discussing the various enforcement powers available to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, including: disgorging ill gained profits, seeking
injunctive relief, imposing civil monetary penalties, barring individuals from serving
as officers and directors of ‘34 Act reporting companies, providing criminal referrals
to the Department of Justice, issuing cease and desist orders against individuals
violating the securities laws, and suspending individuals from practicing before the
Commission).
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that’s a bad thing for them. They don’t like explaining it to their
kids. They don’t like explaining it to their neighbors. But it’s not the
same thing as being afraid that if you do this transaction, if you loot
your company, you’re going to go to jail.
We’ve had this spate of frauds discovered recently. We can argue
whether in particular cases criminal prosecution was justified or not,
whether the perp walk is overshooting the mark or not. But, in
general, bringing criminal charges in egregious cases is a terrific
thing to do. It ought to be done periodically, because managers can
forget about it if too much time goes by.
PROFESSOR PETERS: Well, the felony conviction ended a ninetyyear-old company. Arthur Andersen can no longer certify financial
statements in the United States because they’ve got a felony
62
conviction. With a felony conviction, they’re gone.
MR. DAVIDOW: Bringing criminal actions against companies
versus individuals is another issue that is very much a fair ground for
debate. But in the case of prosecution of individuals, then you’ve
actually got someone who goes to jail and you don’t have 70,000
other people getting put out of work because of it.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: One last question, Professor .
SPEAKER: [Question inaudible].
MR. DAVIDOW: . . . As I understand it from the SEC rules—the
SEC just came out with a full set of rules, I think yesterday
63
afternoon. It’s ninety-three single-spaced pages which I have not,
I’m sorry to say, parsed in time for this session.
But one of the issues to be addressed there and that I presume is
addressed is, “What sort of disclosure needs to be made to the SEC in
cases of so-called noisy withdrawal?” That wouldn’t go as far as what
you’re describing, public disclosure, but perhaps it will provide at
least some level of information for the SEC to get involved.
SPEAKER: [Question inaudible].
MR. GUNDERSON: . . . [T]he other thing to keep in mind, and
maybe this is a little self-serving, but the general counsel would rather
have it be mandatory that they have to go to the board than have it be
mandatory that they have to resign. If you have other things that are
going to hurt the company—keep in mind, if the general counsel is
62. See Weil et al., supra note 21, at A1 (describing the Arthur Andersen felony
conviction).
63. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(requiring an attorney “to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to
the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company.”).
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resigning, he is still the general counsel. His duty is still to protect
the company and to make the best things for the company happen.
It’s going to be very difficult for a general counsel to resign if he
thinks he’s going to generate harm to the company from that. The
best thing is to put the general counsel in the position of being able
to say to the CEO, I don’t have a choice. You either deal with this
properly or if I don’t judge in my professional judgment that you are,
I have to go to the board. That way it keeps it within the company.
By the way, one of the nice things I think about the recent public
debate is, it’s easier for company employees now, including the
general counsel, to think of the board as part of the company. Even
look at the terminology we use, “outside directors.” We’re the only
country that calls them outside directors as if they are not even part
of the company.
I think now rules saying you’ve got to go to the directors are far
better for the general counsel than putting them in the position—
there’s the attorney-client issue and there is the issue about vigorously
representing the corporation and what the impact would be.
PROFESSOR PETERS: I think that while the rules might help,
there are limits to them. They don’t have—as you point out, if an
auditor resigns they have to report—both the auditor and the
company have to file statements with the SEC about the reason
surrounding the resignation. That doesn’t happen very often and
you can kind of figure out why. I mean from the auditors standpoint,
resigning from a client in the first place is a huge economic loss. But
now they’ve got to disclose all of this to the SEC. They’re probably
going to find a way to kind of cover it over because they don’t want to
send up a big red flag to the next client that comes down the road
that they’re a trouble-maker.
So it helps in the sense that it’s there and it’s a hurdle that people
have to get over. It’s really not going to—at least on the auditing side
it hasn’t done a lot to really get at the fundamental economic conflict
that auditors face.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Let’s give this excellent panel a big
hand.
WHEREUPON, A RECESS WAS TAKEN

